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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 18, 1985 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 84-755-cfy
UNITED STATES

Cert to CA9
(Goodwin & Tang) (pc)
son, vdj, dissenting)

(Jame-

Federal/Criminal

Timely

v.
DE HERNANDEZ
gler)

(cocaine

SUMMARY:
pressing

88

smug-

The

cocaine-filled

SG contends
balloons

that CA9 erred

excreted

by

resp,

in supwho was

detained

at

the

border

by Customs Officials

for

the period of

time necessary to examine her bowel movements.
2.
March

5,

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

1983,

resp

arrived

at

flight from Bogota, Colombia.
tion

checkpoint,

where,

following

she
a

the

resp' s

proceeded

to

review of her

passport and

from

a

source

country

Angeles

airport

a

Customs

on

inspection

travel documents,

a

area

she was re-

There, a Customs inpector

luggage and questioned her

her trip to the United States.
came

Los

After passing through an immigra-

ferred to a secondary inspection area.
inspected

Shortly after midnight on

about

The interview revealed that resp

for

narcotics,

had previously made

numerous trips of short duration into the United States, had paid
cash for her ticket, carried little extra clothing or toiletries,
carried $5000 in cash,

had no confirmed hotel reservations, had

no family or friends in the United States, and spoke no English.
Resp claimed she had come to the United States to purchase clothing

and

other

merchandise

for

her

husband's

business,

but

ac-

knowledged she had made no appointments to visit potential sellers.

Based on his observations,

pected

the

that resp was carrying drugs

inspector

immediately sus-

internally,

as she matched

the common profile of such a drug smuggler.
The inspector referred resp to another room for a patdown search,
resp

if

which

she would

failed

to reveal contraband.

He

consent to an x-ray search of her

then asked
abdominal

cavity; she initially consented, but revoked the consent when she
learned she would be handcuffed on the way to a hospital for the
x-ray.

Customs officials

then contacted Customs

Special Agent

Windes

and

search.

requested

He

declined

three options:

him

to

seek

to do so,

but

a

court
informed

order

for

resp that

an

x-ray

she had

to consent to an x-ray search, remain in custody

until she had a bowel movement, or return to Colombia on the next
available flight.
she

would

flight;

be

kept

Resp chose the latter,
under

observation

but was informed that

during

if she excreted any contraband,

her

wait

for

the

she would be arrested.

It turned out that no flight was available for many hours.

Resp

remained under the continuous observation of Customs officers in
their waiting room for 16 hours, during which time she refused to
eat or drink, or to use toilet facilities.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on March 5,

female officers

subjected resp to a second strip search, 1 which failed to reveal
any evidence of contraband.

At this point, Special Agent Windes

decided to seek a court order for x-ray and body cavity searches;
his

affidavit

included

the

facts

that resp had refused to eat,

drink, or use toilet facilities during the 16-hour detention.
about midnight,

At

a federal magistrate issued the order, and resp

was transported to a hospital.
vealed

a

balloon

placed

in

the

containing

prison ward of

There,
cocaine.

a rectal examination reResp

the hospital;

was
over

arrested
the next

and
four

days, she excreted 88 balloons containing 528.4 grams of cocaine.
Prior

to trial,

resp moved

to suppress

the cocaine on

1 It is not entirely clear either from the SG's brief or the
court's opinions when the first strip search occurred.
Apparently, it occurred at the time of the pat-down search, prior
to the detention.

'"'-'•
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the ground that the affidavit supporting the court order for the
body cavity search was tainted by information received during the
unlawful detention of her for

16 hours.

The DC denied the mo-

tion, holding that the Customs officials'

initial questioning of

resp had given them "a very substantial suspicion" that she was
smuggling

narcotics

internally.

This

suspicion

justified

their

seeking her consent to an x-ray search and upon her refusal,

in

detaining her until she could either be placed on a return flight
or had a bowel movement that would confirm or deny their suspicions.

Thus,

the detention was lawful,

and further

information

received during it that supported the court order was not tainted.
A divided panel of CA9 reversed.

It held that the de-

tention was unlawful and therefore, that the information obtained
during the detention tainted the court order and the results of
the body cavity search.
tioning,
tion"
obtain

the Customs agents lacked the necessary "clear

resp was
a

Because at the time of the initial ques-

smuggling drugs

court-ordered

x-ray

internally that was

search,

it was

indica-

required

also unlawful

to
for

them to detain her without such a level of suspicion.
Judge Jameson (dj, Montana) dissented.

The agents had a

strong suspicion she was smuggling drugs; this was sufficient to
justify the

first

strip search.

The detention to await resp's

bowel movement was no more intrusive than a strip search, since
both involve only "passive visual

inspection of the body's sur-

face and, in this case, its waste products."
was lawful.

..

Thus, the detention

Body cavity and x-ray searches, on the other hand,

require

a

"clear

intrude

beyond

indication"

the

body's

of

illegal

surface.

activity

In

because

addition,

they

smuggling

by

ingestion into the alimentary canal does not leave the same external signs as body cavity smuggling does (e.g., unnatural gait,
restricted body movements, evidence of lubricants); the reliable
indicators of alimentary canal smuggling
or use toilet facilities)
time.

Thus,

suspicion,

(refusal to eat, drink,

may only be observed over a period of

"a reasonable period of detention, based on a real

is

the

least

intrusive

and

most

reliable

means

of

identifying alimentary canal smugglers."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The

SG contends

that cert should be

granted because CA9's decision on the level of suspicion needed
to justify a detention to await a bowel movement is in conflict
with decisions of CAll.

In United States v.

Mosquera-Ramirez,

729 F.2d 1352 (CAll 1984), CAll ruled that a 12-hour detention to
await the deft's bowel movement was not unreasonable.

As in this

case, the agents suspected the deft was smuggling drugs internally; after he refused to consent to an x-ray search, they detained
him until he excreted 95 cocaine-filled condoms.

The court ruled

that neither the detention, nor the search of the results of the
bowel movement,

were

unreasonable.

In contrast,

CA9 held

that

detentions must be based on the same high level of suspicion--a
"clear indication" of internal drug smuggling--necessary to warrant a body cavity search.

The SG does not contest the use of

the "clear indication" standard for body cavity searches; it does
contest the CA9's ruling that a detention to await a bowel movement requires the same level of suspicion.
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o
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Moreover,

both

CA5

and

CAll

have

ruled

that

x-ray

searches at the border may be conducted on a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect is smuggling drugs.
ray searches the higher
to

body

cavity

Neither has required for x-

level of certainty usually applied only

searches.

Finally,

CA9's

decision

also

runs

counter to settled law holding that border searches are governed
by somewhat less stringent standards than other searches.
The
these

SG

conflicts

argues
and

that

cert

should

be

prevent

drug

smugglers

granted
from

to

resolve

succeeding

in

their "increasingly adept" methods of smuggling, merely by shifting

their

operations

to points of entry

in

the

Ninth Circuit.

CA9's decision hamstrings the ability of Customs officials to do
their job, and does so by restricting the use of a "foolproof and
relatively unintrusive investigative measure."
4.

DISCUSSION:

The SG is correct that CA9's decision

creates a conflict among the circuits.

This appears to be a re-

curring area of Fourth Amendment law and one that has no small
importance
gling.

to

the

government's

ability

to

restrict

drug

smug-

A response should be called for.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend CFR.

There is no response.
January 3, 1985

Simpson

Opin in petn

January 18, 1985
Court ................... .

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No. 84-755

UNITED STATES
vs.

De HERNANDEZ

HOLD
FOR

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Brennan, J ................... .
White, J ..................... .
Marshall, J .................. .

CERT.
G

VD

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DIS

AFF

REV

<v.<:: ::::.:::: : . . .
v.-v ·················

Blackmun, J ................. .

1. ~ ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ~. ·. ·.:::::

Powell, J ......................

/ 1<" .. .

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Stevens, J .....................

MERITS

V. /. ..

O'Connor, J .................... ~ ... .

AFF

MOTION
G

D

AD SENT

NOT VOTING

1

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

April 5, 1985

Lynda

No. 84-755

United States v. de Hernandez

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether resp, who was reasonably suspected of smuggling
contraband drugs inside her body and who refused to submit to an
x-ray search, could lawfully be detained at the border by Customs
officials for the period of time necessary to examine her bodily
wastes?

2.

Although this case is not directly controlled by any of
this Court's precedent, I am inclined to believe that CA9 should
be reversed.

As I discuss below,

I believe this result follows

logically from this Court's cases on border searches and a recent
~ ~--------------------~----'-----~~
case, United States v. Sharpe, No. 83-529 (March 20, 1985),
involving

detentions.

I

also

think

that

the

facts

amply

~------..-.....__

demonstrate

that

the

Customs

officials

acted

-----

on

suspicion that resp was carrying drugs internally.
supplemental memo from me explaining why I

searches

and

different,

Court's
seizures

more

cases
at

relaxed

have

long

based

431
in

u.s.

part

606,
on

If you want a

think this is so,

since

established

the country's borders are
constitutional

standards

Terry stops conducted within the country.
Ramsey,

reasonable

619

I

~

will be happy to provide one.

This

a

(1977).

Congress's

Such

broad

subject to

than

~.,United

relaxed

that

typical

States v.

standards are

constitutional

power

to

regulate commerce, and have long been recognized as necessary to
prevent

smuggling

and

the

entry

of

prohibited

articles.

Id.

Consequently, routine border searches have never been thought to
be subject to the warrant requirement or

- -----

that

a

search

be

based

on probable

the usual

cause.

Id. ,

requirement
at

617-619. 1

1 The SG also argues that resp is entitled to lesser Fourth
Amendment protection because she is an alien. Under my view of
the case, the Court need not reach this ~estion, and I believe
it should avoid it i
1t can.
esp persuas1 ely argues, however,
that because resp had already been "admitted" by immigration
officials before Customs officials began their investigation of
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

Indeed,

resp concedes that the actions of Customs officials

stopping

and

questioning

her

is whether

the

presented here

were

reasonable;

the

in

question

initial seizure of resp,

and the

--------------------------------------

fruits of the eventual search, were made unlawful by the length
of time the Customs officials detained her, once she refused to
consent to an x-ray search.
--

v"'

'"'--:?'

This Court recently noted in New Jersey v. T.L.O., No.

83-712

that what is a reasonable search or

(January 15, 1985),

seizure
place."

"depends
Slip

on

op.,

the context within which
at

The

10.

Court

the

ruled

search

that

11

takes

[w] here

a

careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests

-1·1..-- .b.

that

the public

interest

is

best served

by

a

Fourth Amendment

standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we
have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."
Court, and you in particular,

Id., at 14.

The

frequently have observed that the

public and the government have an especially compelling interest
in preventing drug trafficking.
1617

/

(June

Mendenhall,
concurring).

20,
446

1983),

u.s.

All of

------

slip

544,

these

United States v. Place, No. 81op.,

at

561-562

7·,

United

(1980)

factors point toward

States

v.

(Powell,

J. ,

requiring

some

lessened standard of reasonableness in the case at bar.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court has held that
some border searches without a warrant and without probable cause

her, she is entitled to many of the same constitutional
protections as citizens. This result would logically follow from
language in Landon v. Plascencia, 459 u.s. 21 (1982).

4.

are permissible, however, most of those cases have been based in
part on the fact that the length of time the person was stopped
was

brief

and

the

Brignoni-Ponce, 422

intrusion

minimal.

u.s.

880

873,

~-,

(1975)

United

States

(Powell, J.).

v.

And, in

United States v. Ramsey, supra, the Court expressly left open the
possibility

that

because

the

of

carried out ...

a

border

search might

.. particularly

u.s.,

431

be

offensive

deemed

manner

at 618 n. 13.

unreasonable

in which

it

is

Thus, resp argues that

the 16 hours she was detained makes unlawful the seizure of her

-----..

and

the

resulting

search

that

produced

the

evidence

she

was

smuggling cocaine.
There

is

support,

however,

in

this

Court's

cases

justifying the length of the detention under the circumstances.

/

In United
Court

States v.

noted

that

Sharpe,

although

determining

the

based

reasonable

on a

consider

11

No.

83-529

brevity

reasonableness of

is

(March
an

20,

important

1985),
factor

the C
in

the seizure of an individual

suspicion standard,

the Court must also

the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop

~

as

well

as

the
Id.,

purposes

of

country at

time

reasonably

slip op.,

preventing
the border

at

drug

10.

needed

to

effectuate

Here,

as

noted

trafficking

and

those

above,

the

protecting

the

from the entry of unlawful articles are

compelling law enforcement goals.

Likewise, the SG persuasively

argues that a long time period may often be required in cases of
this

type

before

the

needed to be examined •

.

•'

suspect

will

excrete

the

bodily

wastes

<r

::~.

The Court in Sharpe also held that a detention of some
length

is

more

likely

to

be

permissible

when

the

police

diligently and do not unnecessarily prolong the detention.
This

at 9.

Id.,

is especially true where the suspect's own actions

have contributed
Id . ,

act

to

at 12-13 •

the added delay about which he complains.

Here,

there

is no allegation that the Customs

officials did anything to add to the length of resp's detention.

-

In fact,

as the SG points out,

largely within resp's control,
entirely by consenting

the length of the detention was
as she could have eliminated it

to an

x-ray

search,

or

by

agreeing

to

excrete her wastes sooner.
Finally, the Sharpe Court noted that in determining the
reasonableness

of

courts

look

should

a

detention
to

based

whether

on

reasonable

alternatives

to

suspicion,

detention

were

available and whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to
pursue them.

!d., at 11.

Here, Customs officials attempted to

pursue the only other alternative to detention--conducting an xAs noted

ray search of resp.

consent to such a search.

above,

however,

resp refused to

The officials were unable to force an

x-ray search because CA9 law requires a court order for such a
search,

issued

on

a

"clear

indication"

carrying contraband internally.

that

the

suspect

is

The officials believed that they

did not have enough information to meet this heightened standard,
and

so,

did

detention,
them

to

not

which

get

the

pursue
produced
warrant.

a

warrant

additional
Thus,

it

until

after

information
cannot

be

the

16-hour

that

enabled

said

that

the

6.

Customs officials unreasonably failed to pursue less intrusive or
more reasonable alternatives.
CA9'~

law,

decision is based on the fact that under its case

the Customs officials did not have enough

support a court-ordered x-ray search;
until

she

produced

hence,
the

information to

according to CA9,

detaining

resp

same

information

was

unlawful.

The SG argues, however, that CA9 erred in requiring a
~

on less than probable cause.

warrant for an
As noted above,
searches.

warrants are generally not required for

United States v. Ramsey, supra.

notes,

the

Fourth

issue,

but

upon

Amendment

probable

requires

cause";

Moreover, as the SG

that

the

SG

"no warrants
argues

that

I

do not

reasonableness
necessarily
evidence

believe

governing

before

in the

Court assume

the

the question of

x-ray
Court.

at

As

notes,

resp

an

as

the

x-ray

search

detention

at

a

In any

the standard of

searches

record on this point.

that

reasonableness

that

shall

where

lesser standard applies, a warrant may not be required.
event,

border

the

border
there

is

is

no

Resp suggests that the

------the same

requires
issue

here.

As

level of
this

view

appears to comport with the SG's position, I recommend it to the
Court.

Then, there will be no problem reconciling this case with

CA9 's opinion,

yet

the Court will not reach out to decide an

issue that is not before it.

I cannot imagine, and the SG does

not argue, that an x-ray search would require a lesser degree of
suspicion on the part of Customs officials than would a lengthy
detention of the sort resp endured here.

7.

Finally,
considerations

point

would

I

support

reversing

out

CA9.

As

practical

that
the

SG

notes,

drug
not

smuggling of this type
even as many as body cavity smuggling would.
33.

See SG's brief 32-

To require a "clear indication" that a person was smuggling

drugs internally before Customs officials could detain him would
virtually

eliminate

Customs'

ability

to

stop

this

type

of

vote

to

smuggler.
All
reverse CA9.

things considered,
If

you would

like

I

recommend

for

me

to

that

you

investigate any of

1--vo.
these points in more depth, I would be happy to do so.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 84-755

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ROSA ELVIRA
MONTOYA DE HERNANDEZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1985]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez was detained by Customs officials upon her arrival at the Los Angeles airport on a flight from Bogota, Colombia. She was
found to be smuggling 88 cocaine-filled balloons in her alimentary canal, and was convicted after a bench trial of various
federal narcotics offenses. A divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed her
convictions, holding that her detention violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because the
Customs inspectors did not have a "clear indication" of alimentary canal smuggling at the time she was detained. 731
F. 2d 1369 (1984). Because of a conflict in the decisions of
the Courts of Appeals on this question and the importance of
its resolution to the enforcement of Customs laws, we
granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - . We now reverse.
Respondent arrived at Los Angeles International Airport
shortly after midnight, March 5, 1983, on Avianca Flight 080,
a direct 10-hour flight from Bogota, Colombia. vJier visa was
in order so she was passed thr_ou.$_h }~!!.migration and proceeded to the Customs ~th'e'CustOnis desk she encou~or Talamantes, who reviewed her
document
oticed from her passport that she had made
at least 8 recent tr1ps o either Miami or Los Angeles.
Talamante
rre respondent to a secondary Customs'
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desk for further questioning. At this desk Talamantes and
another inspector asked respondent general questions concerning herself and the purpose of her trip. Respondent revealed that she spoke no English and had no family or friends
in the United State8-:- She"explained in Spanish tllat sfie-had
come to the United States to purchase goods for her husband's store in Bogota. The Customs mspectors recognized
Bogota as a "source city" for narcotics. Respondent possessed $5,00Qjn cash, mostly $50 bills, but had no billfold.
She indicated to the inspectors that she had no appointdLts
with merchandise vendors, but planned to ride aroun
os
Angeles in taxicabs visiting retail stores such as J. C. Penney
and K-Mart in order to buy goods for her husband's store
with the $5,000.
Respondent admitted that she had no hotel r~servations,
but stated that she planned to stay at a Holiday Inn. Respondent could not reca ho her airline ticket was purchased. when-the inspectors opened respondent'8lrn-e small
va 1se t ey found about 4 changes of "cold weather" clothing.
Respondent had ~es o
ha t e 1g ~she
was wearing. Although respondent possessed no checks,
waym s, credit cards, or letters of credit, she did produce a
Colombian business card and a number of old receipts, waybills, and fabric swatches displayed in a photo album.
At this point Talamantes and the other inspector suspected
that respondent was a "balloon swallower," one who attempts
to smuggle narcotics into this country hidden in her alimentary canal. Over the years Inspector Talamantes had apprehended dozens of alimentary canal smugglers arriving on
Avianca Flight 080. See J. A., at 42; United States v.
Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F. 2d 1300, 1301 (CA9 1983).
The inspectors requested a female Customs inspector to
take respondent to a private area and conduct a patdown and
strip search. During the search the female inspector felt respondent's abdomen area and noticed a firm fullness, as if respondent were wearing a girdle. The search revealed no
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contraband but the inspector noticed that respondent was
wearing two air of elastic under ants with a paper towel lining the crotch area.
When respondent returned to the Customs area and the female inspector reported her discoveries, the inspector in
charge told respondent that he suspected she was smuggling
drugs in her alimentary canal. Respondent agreed to the inspector's request that she be x-rayed at a hospital but in answer to the inspector's query stated that she was pregnant.
She agreed to a pregnancy test before the x-ray. Respondent withdrew the consent for an x-ray when she learned that
she would have to be handcuffed en route to the hospital.
The inspector then gave respondent the option of returning
to Colombia on the next available flight, agreeing to an x-ray,
or remaining in detention until she produced a monitored
bowel movement that would confirm or rebut the inspectors'
susp1c1ons. Respondent chose the first option and was
placed in a Customs' office under observation. She was told
that if she went to the toilet she would have to use a wastebasket in the women's restroom, in order that female Customs inspectors could inspect her stool for balloons or capsules carrying narcotics.
The inspectors refused
respondent's request to place a telephone call.
Respondent sat in the Customs office, under observation,
for the remainder of the night. During the night Customs
officials attempted to place respondent on a Mexican airline
that was flying to Bogota via Mexico City in the morning.
The airline refused to transport respondent because she
lacked a MeXIcan v1sa necessary o an 1 Mexico City. Respondent was dot 2_ermitted to ave, and was informed that
she would be etained until she agreed to an x-ray or her
bowels moved. She remained detained in the Customs office
under observation, for most of the time curled up in a chair
leaning to one side. She refused all offers of food and drink,
and refused to use the toilet facilities. The Court of Appeals
.-...---~
noted that she
exhibited
symptoms of discomfort "consistent
-~'-

.._
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with heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of nature." 731 F.
2d, at 1371.
At the shift change at 4:00 p. m. the next afternoon, almost
16 hours after her flight had landed, respondent still had not
defecated or urinated or partaken of food or drink. At that
time Customs officials sought a court order authorizing a
pregnancy test, an x-ray, and a rectal examination. The federal magistrate issued an order just before midnight that
-~~
evening, which authorized a rectal examination and involuntary x-ray, provided that the physician in charge considered
respondent's claim of pregnancy. Respondent was taken to
a hosptial and given a pr~~ test, which later turned out
to be negative. Before the results of the pregnancy test
were known, a physician conducted a rectal examination and
removed from respondent's rectum a balloon containing a foreign substance. Respondent was then placed formally under
arrest. By 4:10 a. m. respondent had passed 6 similar balloons; over the next 4 days she passed 88 balloons containing
a total of 528 grams of 80% pure cocaine hydroc -roride.
Mter a suppression hearing tlie istrict Court admitted
the cocaine in evidence against respondent. She was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21
U. S. C. §841(a)(1) and unlawful importation of cocaine, 21
U. S. C. §§ 952(a); 960(a).
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeal for
the Ninth Circuit reversed respondent's convictions. The
Court noted that Customs inspectors had a "justifiably high
level of official skepticism about respondent's good motives,
but the inspectors decided to let nature take its course rather
than seek an immediate magistrate's warrant for an x-ray."
731 F. 2d, at 1371. Such a magistrate's warrant required a
"clear indication" or "plain suggestion" that the traveller was
an alimentary canal smuggler under previous decisions of the
Court of Appeals. See United States v. Quintero-Castro,
705 F. 2d 1099 (CA9 1983); United States v. M endez-Jimenez, 709 F. 2d 1300, 1302 (CA9 1983); but cf. South Dakota v.
~
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Opperman, 428 U. S. 367, 370 n. 5 (1976). The court applied
this required level of suspicion to respondent's case. The
court questioned the "humanity" of the inspectors' decision to
hold respondent until her bowels moved, knowing that she
would suffer "many hours of humiliating discomfort if she
chose not to submit to the x-ray examination." The court
concluded that under a "clear indication" standard "the evidence available to the customs officers when they decided to
hold [respondent] for continued observation was insufficient
to support the 16-hour detention." 731 F. 2d, at 1373.
Petitioners contend that the Customs inspectors reasonably suspected that respondent was an alimentary canal
smuggler, and this suspicion was sufficient to justify the detention. In support of the judgment below respondent argues, inter alia, that reasonable suspicion would not support
respondent's detention, and in any event the inspectors did
not reasonably suspect that respondent was carrying narcotics internally.
The Fourth Amendment commands that searches and seizures be reasonable. What is reasonable de ends upon all of
the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself. New Jersey v.
T. L. 0., slip op., at 10-15,-- U. S. - - (1985). The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged
by "balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
103 S. Ct. 2573,- (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S.
648, 654 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523
(1967).
Here the seizure of respondent took place at the international border. Since the founding of our Republic Congress
hasg:rall(ed the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable
cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of du-
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ties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this
country. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606,
616-617 (1977), citing Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
This Court has long recognized Congress' power to police entrants at the border. See Boyd v. United States, 118 U. S.
616, 623 (1886). As we stated recently:
"Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages
at the national border rest on different considerations
and different rules of substantive law from domestic
regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad
comprehensive powers '[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,' Art. I, cl. 3. Historically such broad
powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to
prevent articles from entry."
Ramsey, supra, at 618-619, citing United States v. ThirtySeven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 376 (1971).
Consistently, therefore, with Congress' power to protect
the nation by stopping and examining persons entering this
country, the Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness
is qualitatively different at the international border than in
the interior. Routine searches of the persons and effects of
entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant, 1 and first-class mail
may be opened without a warrant on less than probable
cause, Ramsey, supra. Automotive travellers may be
stopped at fixed check points near the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop is based largely on ethnicity, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543,
562-563 (1973), and boats on inland waters with ready access
See Ramsey, supra, at 616-619; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U. S. 266, 272-273 (1973); id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). As the
Court stated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925):
1

"Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the
country to identify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings and
effects which may be lawfully brought in."
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to the sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion whatever. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 Sulp. Ct.
2573 (1983).
TJ
These cases reflect long-standing concern for the protection of the integrity of the border. This concern is, if anything, heightened by the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics, see United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 561 (1980) (POWELL, J.,
concurring), and in particular by the increasing u'tilizatfon of
alimentary canal smuggling. This desperate practice appears to be a relatively recent addition to the smugglers' repertoire of deceptive practices, and it also appears to be exceedingly difficult to detect. 2 Congress had recognized
these difficulties. 19 U. S. C. § 1582 provides that "all persons coming into the United States from foreign countries
shall be liable to detention and search authorized by [customs
regulations]." Customs agents may "stop, search and examine" any "vehicle, beast or person" upon which an officer sus• See United States v. DeMontoya, 729 F. 2d 1369 (CAll 1984) (required surgery; swallowed 100 cocaine-filled condoms); United States v.
Fino, 729 F. 2d 1357 (CAll 1984) (required surgery; 120 cocaine-filled pellets); United States v. Mejia, 720 F. 2d 1378 (CA5 1983) (75 balloons);
United States v. Couch, 688 F. 2d 599, 605 (CA9 1982) (36 capsules);
United States v. Quintero-Castro, 705 F. 2d 1099 (CA9 1983) (120 balloons); United States v. Saldarrianga-Marin, 734 F. 2d 1425 (CAll 1984);
United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F. 2d 1341 (CAll 1984) (135 condoms);
United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F. 2d 1301 (CA9 1983) (102 balloons); United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F. 2d 1352 (CAll 1984)
(95 condoms); United States v. Castrillon, 716 F. 2d 1279 (CA9 1983) (83
balloons); United States v. Castaneda-Castaneda, 729 F. 2d 1360 (CAll
1984) (2 smugglers; 201 balloons); United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723
F. 2d 1420 (CA9 1984) (85 balloons); United States v. Henao-Castano, 729
F. 2d 1364 (CAll 1984) (85 condoms); United States v. Ek, 676 F . 2d 379
(CA9 1982) (30 capsules); United States v. Padilla, 729 F. 2d 1367 (CAll
1984) (ll5 condoms); United States v. Gomez-Diaz, 712 F. 2d 949 (CA5
1983) (69 balloons); United States v. D'Allerman, 712 F. 2d 100 (CA5 1983)
(80 balloons); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F. 2d 691 (CA9 1984)
(129 balloons).
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pects there is contraband or "merchandise subject to duty."
Id., §482; see also id., §§ 1467; 1481; 19 CFR §§ 162.6, 162.7.
Balanced against the sovereign's interests at the border
are the Fourth Amendment rights of respondent. Having
presented herself at the border for admission, and having
subjected herself to the criminal enforcement powers of the
federal government, 19 U. S. C. § 482, respondent was entitled to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. But
not only is the expectation of privacy less at the border than
in the interior, see, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.,
at 154; cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 515 (1983)
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting), but the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests of the government and the privacy right of the individual is struck much more favorably to
the government at the border. Ante (~l P.
We have no~~_ousl decided what level of suspicion
would "_!Isti C"'.__a: seiZure f an i~trave er !orpurposes
other than a routine bor er search. Cf. a e ~' at
618, n:J.3.
e Court of Appeals held that the initial detention of respondent was permissible only if the inspectors possessed a "clear indication" of alimentary canal smuggling.
731 F. 2d 1~2, citing Quintero- astra, supra; cf. M endez-Jimenez, supra. Thi c ear indication language comes from
· rnia, 384 U. S. 757 (1966),
our opinion in Schmer
but we think that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the
significance of that phrase in the context in which it was used
in Schmerber. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
viewed "clear indication" as an intermediate standard be3

In that case we stated:
"The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any intrusion [beyond the body's surface] on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence
may disappear unless there is an immediate search."
384 U. S., at 769.
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tween "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause." See
Mendez-Jimenez, supra, 709 F. 2d, at~· But we think
that the words in Schmerber were used to mdicate the necessity for particularized suspicion that the evidence sought
might be found within the body of the individual, rather than
as enunciating still a third Fourth Amendment threshold between "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause."
No other court, including this one, has ever adopted
Schmerber's "clear indication" language as a Fourth Amendment standard. See, e. g., Winston v. Lee, Slip Op., at 6-7,
- - U. S. - - (1985) (surgical removal of bullet for evidence). Indeed, another Circuit Court of Appeals, faced
with facts almost identical to this case, has adopted a less
strict standard based upon reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F. 2d 1352, 1355
(CAll 1984). We do not think that the Fourth Amendment's emphasis upon reasonableness is consistent with the
creation of a third verbal standard in addition to "reasonable
suspicion" and "probable cause"; we are dealing with a constitutional requirement of reasonableness, not mens rea, see
United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 403-406 (1980), and
subtle verbal gradations may obscure rather than elucidate
the meaning of the provision in question.
We hold that the detention of a traveller at the border, beyond tifeScope of a roudi1ec ustomss earch and inspection, is
justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the
facts surrouiiOiilgtiie fraverier and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveller is smuggling contraband m her ahmenta.rycallal. 4
' It is also important to note what we do not hold. Because the issues
are not presented today we~at level of suspicion, if
any, is required for non-routine border searches such as strip, body cavity,
or involuntary x-ray searches. Both parties would have us decide the
issue Of wfietlier aliens possess lesser Fourth Amendment rights at the
border; that question was not raised in either court below and we do not
consider it today.

I
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The "reasonable suspicion" standard has been applied in a
number of contexts and effects a needed balance between private and public interests when law enforcement officials must
make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause. It thus
fits well into the situations involving alimentary canal smuggling at the border: this type of smuggling gives no external
signs and inspectors will rarely possess probable cause to arrest or search, yet governmental interests in stopping smuggling at the border are high indeed. Under this standard officials at the border must have a "particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person" of alimentary canal smuggling. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418
(1981), citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 21, n. 18.
The facts, and their rational inferences, known to Customs
inspectors in this case clearly supported a reasonable suspicion that respondent was an alimentary canal smuggler. We
need not belabor the facts, including respondent's implausible
story, that supported this suspicion, see supra text at J-4.
The trained Customs inspectors had encountered many alimentary canal smugglers and certainly had more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," Terry, 392
U. S., at 27, that respondent was smuggling narcotics in her
alimentary canal. The inspectors' suspicion was a "'commonsense conclusio[n] about human behavior' upon which
'practical people,' including government officials, are entitled
to rely." T. L. 0 ., supra, slip op., at 19, - - U. S. - - ,
citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981).
The final issue in this case is whether the detention of respondent was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it initially. In this regard we have
cautioned that courts should not indulge in "unrealistic second guessing," Sharpe, supra, at?, and we have noted that
"creative judges, engaged in potll hoc evaluations of police
conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means
by which the objectives .of the police might have been accomplished," !d. But "the fact that the protection of the public

1

A

1/

84-75~0PINION

UNITED STATES v. MONTOYA DE HERNANDEZ

11

might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less inclusive' means does not, in itself, render the search unreasonable." Id., citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447
(1983). Authorities must be allowed "to graduate their response to the demands of any particular situation." Place,
462 U. S., at 709, n. 10. Here, respondent was detained incommunicado for almost 16 hours before inspectors sought a
warrant; the warrant then took a number of hours to procure,
through no apparent fault of the inspectors. This length of
time undoubtedly exceeds any other detention we have approved under reasonable suspicion. But we have also consistently rejected hard-and-fast time limits, Sharpe; Place,
supra, at 709, n. 10. Instead, "common sense and ordinary
human experience must govern over rigid criteria." Sharpe,
supra, atj.
The ru'dimentary knowledge of the human body which
judges poSseSs in coiliiiiOnwiththe restOfhumankind tells us
thatailmentary cana smugglingcanllOfbe detected in the
amount of time in which other illegal activity may be investigated through brief Terry-type stops. It presents few, if
any external signs; a quick frisk will not do, nor will even a
strip search. In the case of respondent the inspectors had
available, as a~ ~ernative to simply awaiting her bowel
movement, anf-X-ray. They offered her the alternative of
submitting herself to that procedure. But when she refused
that alternative, the Customs inspectors were left with only
two practical alternatives: detain her for such time as necessary to confirm their suspicions, a detention which would last
much longer than the typical "Terry" stop, or turn her loose
into the interior E:easonably suspected contraband drugs (})

~
c~~t_~'lv7 ~
The inspectors in this case followed this former procedure.
They no doubt expected that respondent, having recently disembarked from a 10-hour direct flight with a full and stiff abdomen, would produce a bowel movement without extended
delay. But her visible efforts to resist the call of nature,

;0
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which the court below labeled "heroic," disappointed this
expectation and in turn caused her humiliation and discomfort. Our prior cases have refused to charge police with delays in investigatory detention attributable to the suspect's
evasive actions, see Sharpe, supra, at 11-12; id., at 9 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment), and that principle applies here as well. Respondent alone was responsible for
much of the duration and discomfort of the seizure.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the detention
in this case was not unreasonably long. It occurred at the
international border, where the Fourth Amendment balance
of interests leans heavily to the government. At the border,
Customs officials have more than merely an investigative law
enforcement role. They are also charged, along with Immigration officials, with protecting this nation from entrants
who may bring anything harmful into this country, whether
that be communicable diseases, narcotics, or explosives.
See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(23); 1182(a)(6); 1222; 19 CFR
§§162.4-162.7. See also 19 U.S.C. §482; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a). In this regard the detention of a suspected alimentary canal smuggler at the border is analogous to the detention of a suspected tuberculosis carrier at the border: both
are detained until their bodily processes dispel the suspicion
that they will introduce a harmful agent into this country.
Cf. 8 U. S. C. § 1222; 42 CFR pt. 34; 19 U. S. C. §§ 482, 1582.
Respondent's detention was long, uncomfortable, indeed, \
humiliating; but both its length and its discomfort r~ed
solely from the method by which sh c ose to smuggle illicit
drugs into is coun ry. n Adams v. Williams, 40 U. S.
143~-stop case, we said that "the Fourth
Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur
or a criminal to escape." 407 U. S., at 145. Here, by analogy, in the presence of articulable suspicion of smuggling in
her alimentary canal, the Customs officers were not required
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by the Fourth Amendment to pass respondent and her 88 cocaine-filled balloons into the interior. Her detention for the
period of time necessary to either verify or dispel the suspicion was not unreasonable. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
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